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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

VELMA MARCHANT, ELMA WINTERTON,
LEORA ROBINSON, WANDA PENROD,
MONA LICHTY, MERLE ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 870320
vs.
PARK CITY, a municipal corporation, and THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants-Respondents.
* * * * * * * * *

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
* * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the filing of the Appellants1 Brief in this action,
the Utah Court of Appeals has handed down a decision which
materially affects this action and which requires emphasis on
some of the specific facts as to the Plaintiffs1 possession of
the Park City home.

The issue of possession and abandonment

materially relates to the statutes of limitations (including
adverse possession statutes), tax title and estoppel issues
raised in the primary Briefs.
Respondent's Brief states that the first date of possession
claimed by the Plaintiffs was 1925 (Respondent's Brief p.8).
This is a misstatement of fact.

The unrefutted testimony of the

Plaintiff, Merle Anderson, was, that to her personal knowledge,
her parents had resided in this home and on this property since
at least 1910 (T. p.40).

The first Tax Deed (Ex. 5) to William Rolfe is dated 1914.
There is no dispute that the possession of the Plaintiffs, their
families and their tenants continued uninterrupted until 1964 and
that the home was not actually used as a residence for some years
after that.

However, because of the pronouncement by our Court

of Appeals in Adair v. Bracken, 70 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 39 (1987) the
activities of the Plaintiff subsequent to 1964 also reflect their
intent that this property belongs to them.
After 1964, one or more of the Plaintiffs visited or went to
the Park City property at least once a year (T. p.65).
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs continued to treat the property as
their own and continued to "possess" it, as evidenced by the
testimony of Merle Anderson.

That testimony is summarized in

pages 53-61 of the Transcript which are attached to this Reply
Brief.

That testimony demonstrates:
1978 - Park City Building Inspector wrote the
Plaintiff to rehabilitate the property (T* p.53, Ex.
17).

Park City was told that the property was going to

be cleaned up, not to tear the house down and that
Plaintiffs wanted to take care of the property.
In the late 70s and early 80s, the Plaintiffs were
involved in the property a lot.
After 1980 one of the Plaintiffs, Merle Anderson,
commenced keeping notes about the activities.

The

action as reflected by those notes included: July, 1980
putting in a new floor (T. p.57); July 24 1980 putting
on a roof (T. p.58); July 26, 1980 attempting to get the
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electricity turned on (T. p.58); July 11, 1980
contacting an attorney, Robert Orton, regarding transfer
of the title of the property (T. p.58); August 11, 1980
getting an engineer and arranging for a survey (T.
p.58); August 19, 1980 talked to Park City about the
survey (T. pp. 58-59); August 28 1980 contacted person
about the survey and the title company as well as an
attorney (T. p.59); September 1, 1980 went to Park City
to install electric pipe (T. p.59); September 2, 1980
called Park City Power and Light to have power turned on
(T. p.59); September 2, 1980 called Park City and the
Building Inspector for inspection (T. p.59); August,
1982 called Mr. Felton, attorney (T. p.60); August, 1982
visited property (T. p.60); September, 1982 went to Salt
Lake to see about letter to the City after discovering
the property was demolished.
In addition to this involvement, it is important to note
that, aside from this litigation, no one has ever asserted any
property interest in this yard and home, nor has anyone ever said
that the Plaintiff and their family did not own the property (T.
p.61) for 70 years.
The Court also found that the Plaintiffs' predecessors
worked for Silver King Coalition Mines and were permitted to
occupy the premises.

The testimony relied upon by the Defendants

was from Mr. Ed Osika and is found on Page 174 of the Transcript
(Respondents1 Brief, p. 23). A copy of Page 174 is attached to
this Brief.

Mr. Osika's testimony was:
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"I am aware that there were situations that did ocur,
but I have no real personal knowledge of early history
in that regard."
Also, Silver King Coalition Mines did not even claim any
interest until 1927, at least 17 years after Mr. Rolfe had
acquired this property.

Plaintiffs had no knowledge that their

grandfather, grandmother, or father ever worked for any mining
company.
Defndants agree with the Plaintiffs1 position that there are
no records or evidence that anyone other than Plaintiffs1
grandfather, William Rolfe, paid the real property taxes before
1931 (Respondents' Brief, p. 9 ) .
Plaintiffs requested the Trial Court to amend its Findings
and Conclusions (R. pp.374-377, Addendum 3) and to make
additional findings as to estoppel and possession.

The Court

summarily refused to consider any of the issues raised in that
Motion (Addendum).

ARGUMENT

I.
PLAINTIFFS1 POSSESSION HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS SINCE AT
LEAST 1910 AND THERE WAS NO ABANDONMENT OF THE PREMISES
The issue of the possession of the premises by the
Plaintiffs is fundamental to a majority of the defenses raised by
the Respondents, especially since the Court adopted the position
that it would compute the relevant time periods back from the
time of trial rather than evaluate the vesting of title
commencing from the date of first possession, which was at the
turn of the century.
- 4 -

The Utah Court of Appeals in Adair v. Bracken, 70 Ut. Adv.
Rpts. 39 (1986) evaluated abandonment of real property and, at
page 40 stated:
"On the other hand, evidence that support a finding that
Appellants did not intentionally abandon their
contractual rights and interest is substantial. Jane
Adair testified that they visited the land "many times"
between March, 1981 and May, 1984. She provided several
specific examples, including camping on the land during
a family reunion in 1982, snowmobiling there two times
one year, and once the other two years, and spending a
weekend or week there each summer. The Adairs also gave
their sister their proxy to vote as landowners at a
June, 1983 organizational meeting to discuss a proposed
water users association.
These actions can only be regarded as unequivocal
expressions of the Adairs1 intent to use the property
and not abandon their contractual interest in it.
* * * * *

We therefore conclude that the Court's finding of
abandonment is against the clear weight of the evidence
and, as such, is clearly erroneous and must be set
aside."
There is a striking similarity in the actions of the Plaintiffs1
family and the Adair family.

The unequivocal expression of

intent of the Plaintiffs was that they owned the property and
continue to do so to this day.

This is substantially buttressed

by the fact that even the Defendant, Park City, recognized their
ownership interest and sent them letters asking them to fix the
property (Exs. 16 and 17, T. p.53).

II.
TITLE UNEQUIVOCALLY VESTED IN PLAINTIFFS1
PREDECESSORS PURSUANT TO ADVERSE POSSESSION
STATUTES OR PLAINTIFFS1 USE IS PRESCRIPTIVE
The issue of adverse possession under our statute is
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addressed in Appellants' Brief and will not be reargued here
except as to a new decision by this Court.
Respondents agree that there is no evidence that anyone
other than the Plaintiffs' predecessors paid any property taxes
on the underlying real estate, or otherwise, prior to 1931
(Respondents' Brief, p.9). In 1917 Plaintiffs' grandfather,
William Rolfe, received a tax deed from Summit County which
recites payment of some taxes (Ex. 5 ) . Both parties agree that
this is the only available evidence of payment of taxes before
1931.
Respondents argue that the case of Park West Village v.
Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) does not apply to this case.
In Royal Street Land Company v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104 (Utah, 1987)
this Court reaffirmed the Avise case and stated:
"We recently held in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise,
714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) that an adverse possessor
meets the requirements of § 78-12-12 to pay all taxes
which have been levied and assessed if he pays all taxes
levied and assessed on the improvements when no taxes
are levied and assessed on the surface of the land."
The unrefutted testimony is that all taxes which were levied
and assessed were paid by William Rolfe and his possession was
open and notorious.

The requirements of the adverse possession

statute were met and title vested prior to any other party paying
taxes.

Once the fee title to the property is vested (1917) all

of the other actions are irrelevant and cannot defeat the
perfected, statutory title of the Plaintiffs.
Even if the Court finds that taxes were not paid, the trial
court conclusion that prescriptive use did not apply is clearly
an error which requires reversal.

Prescriptive rights in the
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property may be acquired after adverse use of 20 years, Lund v.
Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P.33 (1908) and the payment of taxes is
not required to establish such use Pace v. Jerman, 684 P.2d 56
(Utah, 1984) .

CONCLUSION
The underlying defect with the Trial Court's decision was
its misapprehension of the historical facts in this case as
applied to the law and the controlling decision of Park West
Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) which resolved the
exact same issue as to the contiguous property.
Plaintiffs1 family have lived and treated this property as
their own since the turn of the century, without interference.
Park City treated the property as belonging to the Plaintiff, and
inquiries with the County by members of the Plantiffs' family
verified payment of taxes and the fact that the County knew and
treated Plaintiffs as the owners.

Only when the property became

important to the State of Utah, some 70 years later, because they
need it for a right-of-way, do the Defendants assert some
interest.

Even then, they do not assert that interest by

requesting a declaratory judgment action or filing a condemnation
proceeding, they simply hire someone to destroy the home and
proceed with their roadwork, thereby leaving the Plaintiffs (ages
60 to 8 0 ) , to do the best they can.
ED this *"
S>
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

day of January, 1988.
n

*

,

- " >

/ ,
•

Robert Felton
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TRANSCRIPT
Pages 53 through 61

1

J

Q

Who did the letter identify Mr. Scanter as?

2 I

A

He was someone who wrote to us from the Park

3

I

4

I

Q

Do you have a copy of his letter?

5 J

A

I can't remember.

6

1

City Building Inspector.

copy.

Do you know?

It seems like we did have a

Whether we lost it, I think we did.

7 |

Q

Let me show you —

8 j

A

Yes.

9 J

Q

This is the other letter?

10 I

A

Uh-huh (yes).

n I

Q

This is Exhibit 17, the date appearing on that

12 I is April of

f

is this what you mean?

79?

13

A

Yes.

u I

Q

This is '78.

15 J

A

I think the one from this one we probably lost

You have any other letters?

16 I track of.
17 I

Q

Can you recall what the letter was about?

18 J

A

I think he just told us that the property needed

19 J to be fixed up or we had to do something.

They were going

20 I to try to clean up Park City, so we were going to try to
21 J clean it up, too.
22 I

Q

And that was the purpose of this letter?

23 J

A

Yes.

24 I

Q

And what was the reason you wrote this letter?

25 J

A

Told him not to tear it down, we wanted to take

53

care of it.
Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiffs'

Q

Exhibit 1 7 and ask you if you can identify that letter?
A

This is another letter from Scanter.

It came to

mother.
Q

There is some writing on the back of this exhibit.

Do you know who wrote that?
A

I am sure I must have written this on here.

This

letter v/as sent to mother, Ethel Rolfe, in Oakley, Utah.
Q

And where did you find this letter?

A

In the documents.

Q

Did you reply to this letter?

A

I don't remember whether I did or not.
MR. FELTON:

Vie would move admission of Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 17, Your Honor.
MR. SMITH:

We are going to object on foundation,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Why does it lack foundation?

Who is

it from?
MR. FELTON:

City.

Mr. Scanter.

THE COURT:

Park City.

MR. SMITH:

It purports to be a letter from the

I suppose we can object on hearsay.

It is being

I admitted to prove something and the personi is not here

j

I to identify he wrote the letter f or wrote the let ter or
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signed the letter.
THE COURT:
Q

Objection is sustained.

(By Mr. Felton)

Merl, in late, early-late 70fs,

or early 80's, were you involved in this property a lot?
A

xv-o. We were the one —

my family was the one

that was really working on it to get it fixed up.
Q

I should have it marked.

I am sorry.

It wasn't marked,

And at that time were you also talking with

people about the property?

People in Park City or people

other places?
A

We tried to get —

we talked to Park City about

it, about getting the lights turned on.

We went up there.

We re-wired the house.
MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, could I voir dire the

THE COURT:

You may.

MR. SMITH:

Could you tell me who you talked to

witness?

at Park City about the electricity?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. SMITH:

Could you please tell me?

THE WITNESS:

I went right to the Utah Power and

Light office, I am sorry.
MR. SMITH:

Thank you, Your Honor.

point I am trying to bring out.

That is the

Park City has never had

an electrical utilitv.

5

THE WITNESS:
MR. FELTON:
THE COURT:

That is right.
I will object to that.

That probably should have been

brought out on cross examination.

If you had an objection

I

as to foundation, that is what it should have been.
MR. SMITH:

Mo objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Sometimes we get those things mixed

up, but that testimony is in.
Q

(By Mr. Felton)

Merl, do you have a real fresh

recollection about everything you did at this time?
A

No, if I hadn't written down a few things, I

wouldn't remember.

It is hard to remember dates and all of

this.
Q

Let me show you Plaintiffs' Exhibit 41 and ask

you if you can identify this?
A

' This is a little log I wrote down, kind of keeping

track of times we went up to Park City.

And sometimes I

wrote it down and sometimes I didn't.
Q

As to the dates and the actions reflected on

that exhibit, were those made on or about the time identifiedl
When I say
A
'*•••' Q

—
Pretty much so.

I tried to write it down then.

If you look at that, does that document refresh

your memory as to why you wrote those down and the subject
matter of each of those recollections?
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A

Yes, it kind of refreshes my memory.

Q

Would you read it, please?

A

It says --

Q

You have got to start at the first, though.
THE COURT:

Let's take a recess. We have been

going quite a while and Dorothy needs a rest. Let's take
a ten-minute recess at this time.
(At 10:55 a.m. Court recessed until approximately
11:05 a.m.)
THE COURT:

Let the record show that the Court

just had a conference with counsel in chambers and the
Court in regards to 14, Exhibit 14, has on further
consideration felt that it should reserve its ruling as
to whether or not 14 will be received, and the record
should now reflect that Exhibit 14-P is not received.
However, the Court has it under consideration.

Okay, you

may proceed.
MR. FELTON:
Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Felton)

Merl, would you read the notes

that you have previously identified?
A

"1980, July:

Val and Marvel went to Park City

to put in the floor in the front room."
Q

Who are these people?

A

Val is my oldest son and Marvel is my husband,

Marvel Anderson.
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Q

To expedite this, if they are going somewhere

and doing something is that the property in question?

J

A

That is the property we are talking about here.

Q

Go on.

A

" —

front room and roof.1'

I

"July 24: Val, Marvel and Vance.'1

Val Anderson

is my eldest son, Marvel my husband and Vance Anderson my
second son put on the rest of the roof.
boys from California.

These are our

J

These two eldest ones.

I

July 26: "We are up to Park City to see about

I

why they haven't turned on the electricity."
July 11:

(

"Talked to Attorney Orton on Park City

property about getting the probate into mother's name.
said to get back, to him.

He

It would depend on how much the

property was worth."

J
I
I
I

"August 11: Went to Oakley and took mother to

J

Park City to see engineer, to see property, to have it

I

surveyed, talked to Jan's assistant."

I

August 15:
find out cost.

"Called Steve 3eker in Park City to

He will call me back."

August 15:

I

"Steve Beker called Sean," that is

our son at home, "while we were gone to the temple. And
he said for us to call him back.

I called but he had

left on an errand."
August 19:

"Went to Park City to see about survey.1'
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August 28:

"Went to see Earold Styles about

survey and also title company.
start the survey.

Paid Styles $200 to

Also got back to the deed from Lawyer

Christiansen."
Monday, Labor Day, September 1st:

"Went to Park

City to put up new rigid, pipe for electricity."
Tuesday September 2nd:

"Called Park City, Utah

Power and Light, to have lights turned on."
Q

That was all 1980?

A

That was all in 1930. And now this is still 193

August 5:

"Went to Coalville, took mother, talked to

Attorney Christiansen about probate."
August 7:

"Called Christiansen's office. He

was not in."
Q

Is that Terry Christiansen you are referring

A

Here (indicating).

Q

The Assistant Summit County Attorney?

A

Yes.

Q

Go on.

A

August 11:

to?

"Placed a person-to-person call to

Attorney Orton."
And September 2nd: "Called Park City Hall in
Park City.

Also called inspector in Park City to have

the pipe inspected."

August, 1982, "Called Mr. Felton, the attorney."
August, 1982, "Went to Park City.

Someone had

put a fence around the property, Rolfe property.11
And 1982, "Went to Salt Lake to see about a
letter to the city about our house. • They had torn it
down."
MR. FSLTON:

Thank you.

Your Honor, under the

rules we are not capable of admitting this document, though
the adverse party is. So, I will leave it there. We
have read it.
THE COURT:
possibilities.

Under the rules you have two

You have a document that is used to refresh

a witness's testimony, in which case it should not be
read into evidence, but may only be used to refresh the
witness's testimony and you must give the adverse party a
chance to review that document, or it is a recorded
recollection.

It is something that was recorded at or

near the time things were done and, in which case, the
document is admitted and then you can have it read into
evidence, I suppose.
way.

But it had no objections either

Right now the testimony is in and the document just

sits there and you arenft offering it because you can't:
under

the

rules?

MR. FSLTON:

That is correct, Your Honor.

wanted to alert you as to the reason why we are not.

I

Your Honor, there are a couple of items out
of order here that we have reviewed.

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 18,

which is a claim which I filed with Park City August 30th,
dated August 30, 1982, and a response from Tim Clyde,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 we would move admission of those
two documents, Your Honor.
MR* SMITH:

No objection, Your Honor.

I think

we stipulated to those.
THE COURT:

Mr. Bachiaan?

MR. BACHMAN:
THE COURT:
Q

No objection, Your Honor.
18 and 19 are received.

(3y Mr. Felton)

Merl, in your conversations with

Mr. Scanter or the other people that you have testified to
in regards to your notes, did anyone ever assert or tell
you that you didn't own the property or your family
didn't?
A

No.

Q

Did anyone ever tell you that someone, other than

you or your family owned the property?
A

No.

Q

Merl, has the use of the property historically

gone on for as long as you have knowledge of it?

As you

described it, has that use been continuous?
A

It has been continuous, yes.

Q

To the average person, is it obvious to the
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TRANSCRIPT
Page 17 4

lease, only our permission, verbal permission, simply
because the individual was under contract to provide
cleaning services for the offices.
Q

Are you aware of any other circumstances currently

of that nature?
A

Currently, I am not.

Q

Are you familiar with the history of that

practice by United Park or its predecessor?
A

I am aware that there were situations that

did occur, but I have no real personal knowledge of
early history in that regard.
Q

Would it be fair to say that you are aware

of a practice of United Park or its predecessor to allow
occupancy of United Park land?
A

In some instances, yes.

Q

Thank you.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Osika.

If I were to show you again our Defendants1 Exhibit 35,
you
if / were to look at the legal description contained
on the first page there, the page with the date of 1953,
would you be able to trace the outline of that description
on Defendants1 Exhibit 25?
MR. FELTON:

If you want, this is also part of

my understanding of the stipulation.
MR. CARTER:

If that is the case, we would

proffer the description that is contained on these deeds

MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT

Robert Felton, 1056
5 Triad Center, #585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone: (801)359-9216
Attorney for Plaintiff

V - \:•
,.

'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

VELMA MARCHANT, et aL
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
PARK CITY, et aL
•
Defendants.

MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 7174

* * * * * * * * * * * *

,_

Robert Felton, attorney for Plaintiff, hereby moves this Court to amend the
.

'

.

•

•

'

.

•

'

•

•

"

.

'

/

'

"

'

-

•

i

•

Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in the above-entitled action as
follows:

*
;s ;

',':.,'
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Finding of Fact No. 3: There is no evidence that Silver King Coalition Mines
Co. ever allowed anyone to construct homes on company property.

The only testimony

was from Mr. Osika, who never worked for Silver King Coalition Mine Co. and had no
knowledge of any matters before 1953 with the sale of the property to United Park Mines
for whom he was employed. Plaintiff's grandfather bought this property as a residence in
1909, and Silver King Coalition did not even acquire any i n t e r e s t in any of the property
until 1927. There's no testimony t h a t the Rolfes ever worked for Silver King Coalition
Mines or any of the predecessors in the i n t e r e s t s of the Defendants.
2. Finding of F a c t No. 4: There is no evidence that Plaintiff's predecessors ever
worked for Silver King Coalition Mines or were permitted to construct a home on the
r e a l property in question.

The evidence specifically supports the conclusion that the

Plaintiff's predecessors never worked for Sliver King Coalition Mines or any other entity
within the chain of t i t l e .

With the death of William Rolfe in 1939, his widow resided in

the house until approximately 1946 and thereafter rented i t t o other women until the
1960's. None of these people were ever employed by any entity i n t h e Defendant's chain
of title, and t h e r e Is no evidence to support this finding.
3 . Finding of F a c t No. 5: This is not supported by the evidence in t h a t there was
no evidence t h a t any r e a l property taxes were assessed by Summit County other than
those assessed to William Rolfe until a t l e a s t 1931.
4. Finding of F a c t No. 6: This should be amended to reflect payment since 1931
and should include the f a c t t h a t Plaintiffs were the only persons paying taxes prior to
t h a t time.
5. Finding of F a c t No. 7: This should be amended to include after 1931.
6. Finding of F a c t No. 8: Should include a finding as to the possession and use of
plaintiffs and their predecessors and the year in which said possession ceased, if t h a t is
the finding of the Court.

H;,

7. Finding of F a c t No. 9: Should include the fact t h a t not only is plaintiffs 1 claim
of title to the r e a l property in question, discontinuous, but so Is t h a t of the defendant's.
8. Finding of F a c t No. 12: Should be amended to reflect t h a t Park City claimed
ownership of the property a t the time the demolition permit was granted or, in the
alternative, t h a t Park City had recognized the interests of the plaintiff and had informed
them to repair the house a t the time the demolition permit was granted.
9.

Finding of F a c t No. 13:

Should be amended to s t a t e t h a t the evidence

presented was insufficient to support an award of damages. There was, in fact, evidence
admitted as to the value of the s t r u c t u r e .
10. Finding of Fact No. 16: This is incorrect and should be deleted. The evidence
clearly supports that notice of claim was given to Park City on August 30, 1982. The
September 20, 1982 d a t e referred to by the Court in its Memorandum Opinion refers to

(

.c.

the date of the response denying the claim, signed by Mr. Tom Clyde, Park City
Attorney.
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Plaintiffs request an amendment to Conclusions of Law as follows:
1. Conclusion of Law No. 2: Must address the insufficient description in the deed
constituting defendants' claim of title, including absence of certain grantors necessary to
complete that title.
2. Conclusion of Law No. 5: Should be stricken as contrary to law when, in fact,
adverse possession can be maintained against a political subdivision and against the
Defendant State of Utah.
3 . Conclusion of Law No. 6: Should be amended to address the fact that title had
ripened in the plaintiffs and their predecessors in 1917 as to adverse possession, and in
1920 as to a prescriptive easement for the use of the property. Since title was vested or
the easement perfected, divestment can only occur according to law, and the Conclusion
of Law fails to address this issue.
4. Conclusion of Law No. 8: Should be stricken as plaintiffs did comply with the
Governmental Immunity Act as to Park City having duly filed their claim August 30,
1982.
5. Conclusion of Law No. 10: Must be amended as contrary to the evidence.
6.

Conclusion of Law No. 11: Should be altered, since the issue of prescriptive

easement is very germane to the issue and has been ignored by the Court. A conclusion
of law as to the use of the property, the time of i t s use, and persons during the historical
existence of predecessors' claim should be addressed in the conclusion.
7. The Court should make a conclusion as to the sufficiency of the chain of title
of the defendants, both as to the description in the deed and the gaps in the title.

(

8. A conclusion of law as to the applicability of the Marketable Title Act and the
f a c t that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the property pursuant to a recorded
instrument for an excess of 40 years*
Plaintiffs further move this Court t h a t the Judgment be amended in accordance
with the Requested Amendments to t h e Findings and Conclusions, t h a t the Judgment be
reversed; t h a t the property be awarded to Plaintiff. In t h e alternative, Plaintiffs move
this Court for a new t r i a l for and on the grounds the verdict is not supported by the
evidence, and the Court has badly misconstrued the evidence and has failed to recognize
the vesting of the property lights in the plaintiffs and their predecessors.
DATED this

day of J u n e , 1987. / v ? •:•;'/• .; ; ^:"'

Robert Felton •••;••• .; :••• • MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I certify t h a t I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY by United States first-class mall, postage prepaid, to:

J . Craig Smith
Park City Municipal CorporatLon
P e 0o Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Alan Bachman, Esq.
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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